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Abstract : We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which
the players have an asymmetric information on the random payoff. We prove that the game
has a value and characterize this value in terms of dual solutions of some second order
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1 Introduction
This paper is devoted to a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which
the players have different information on the payoff. In this basic model, the terminal cost
is chosen (at the initial time) randomly among a finite set of costs {gij , i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, j ∈
{1, . . . , J} }. More precisely, the indexes i and j are chosen independently according to a
probability p ⊗ q on {1, . . . , I} × {1, . . . , J}. Then the index i is announced to the first
player and the index j to the second player. The players control the stochastic differential
equation
dXs = b(s,Xs, us, vs)ds+ σ(s,Xs, us, vs)dBs, s ∈ [t, T ],
Xt = x,
through their respective controls (us) and (vs) in order, for the first player, to minimize
E[gij(XT )] and, for the second player, to maximize this quantity. Note that the players
do not really know which payoff they are actually optimizing because the first player, for
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instance, ignores which index j has been chosen. The key assumption in our model is that
the players observe the evolving state (Xs). So they can deduce from this observation the
behavior of their opponent and try to derive from it some knowledge on their missing data.
The formalization of such a game is quite involved: we refer to the second section of
the paper where the notations are properly defined. In order to describe our results, let us
introduce the upper and lower value functions V + and V − of the game:
V +(t, x, p, q) = inf
αˆ∈(Ar(t))I
sup
βˆ∈Br(t))J
Jp,q(t, x, αˆ, βˆ),
V −(t, x, p, q) = sup
βˆ∈(Br(t))J
inf
αˆ∈(Ar(t))I
Jp,q(t, x, αˆ, βˆ).
where Jp,q(t, x, αˆ, βˆ) is the expectation under the probability p⊗ q of the payoff associated
with the strategies αˆ = (αi)i∈{1,...,I} and βˆ = (βj)j∈{1,...,J} of the players. The strategy αˆ
takes into account the knowledge by the first player of the index i while βˆ takes into account
the knowledge of j by the second player. Our main result is that, under Isaacs’condition,
the two value functions coincide: V + = V −. Moreover, V := V + = V − is the unique
viscosity solution in the dual sense of some second order Hamilton-Jacobi equation. This
means that
(i) V is convex with respect to p and concave with respect to q,
(ii) the convex conjugate of V with respect to p is a subsolution of some Hamilton-Jacobi-
Isaacs (HJI) equation in the viscosity sense,
(iii) the concave conjugate of V with respect to q is a supersolution of a symmetric HJI
equation,
(iv) V(T, x, p, q) =
∑
i,j piqjgij(x) where p = (pi)i∈{1,...,I} and q = (qj)j∈{1,...,J}.
We strongly underline that in general the value functions are not solution of the standard
HJI equation: indeed V does not satisfy a dynamic programming principle in a classical
sense.
An important current in Mathematical Finance is the modeling of insider trading (see for
example Amendinger, Becherer, Schweizer [2] or Corcuera, Imkeller, Kohatsu-Higa, Nualart
[7] and references therein). The basic question studied in these works is to evaluate how
the addition of knowledge for a trader—i.e., mathematically, the addition to the original
filtration of a variable depending on the future—shows up in his investing strategies, and
an important tool is the theory of enlargement of filtrations. Our approach is completely
2
different. Indeed, what is important in our game is not that the players have “more”
information than what is contained in the filtration of the Brownian motion, but that their
information differs from that of their opponent. In some sense we try to understand the
strategic role of information in the game.
The model described above is strongly inspired by a similar one studied by Aumann
and Maschler in the framework of repeated games. Since their seminal papers (reproduced
in [3]), this model has attracted a lot of attention in game theory (see [11], [13], [15], [16]).
However it is only recently that the first author has adapted the model to deterministic
differential games (see [5], [6]).
The aim of this paper is to generalize the results of [5] to stochastic differential games
and to game with integral payoffs. There are several difficulties towards this aim. First the
notion of strategies for stochastic differential games is quite intricated (see [12], [14]). For
our game it is all the more difficult that the players have to introduce additional noise in
their strategies in order to confuse their oponent. One of the achievements of this paper is
an important simplification of the notion of strategy which allows the introduction of the
notion of random strategies. This also simplifies several proofs of [5]. Second the existence of
a value for “classical” stochastic differential games relies on a comparison principle for some
second order Hamilton-Jacobi equations. Here we have to be able to compare functions
satisfying the condition (i,ii,iv) defined above with functions satisfying (i,iii,iv). While for
deterministic differential games (i.e., first order HJI equations) we could do this without too
much trouble (see [5]), for stochastic differential games (i.e., second order HJI equations)
the proof is much more involved. In particular it requires a new maximum principle for
lower semicontinuous functions (see the appendix) which is the most technical part of the
paper.
The paper is organized in the following way: in section 2, we introduce the main nota-
tions and the notion of random strategies and we define the value functions of our game.
In section 3 we prove that the value functions (and more precisely the convex and concave
conjugates) are sub- and supersolutions of some HJ equation. Section 4 is devoted to the
comparison principle and to the existence of the value. In Section 5 we investigate stochas-
tic differential games with a running cost. The appendix is devoted to a new maximum
principle.
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2 Definitions.
2.1 The dynamics.
Let T > 0 be a fixed finite time horizon. For (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× IRn, we consider the following
doubly controlled stochastic system :
dXs = b(s,Xs, us, vs)ds+ σ(s,Xs, us, vs)dBs, s ∈ [t, T ],
Xt = x,
(2.1)
whereB is a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion on a given probability space (Ω,F , P ).
For s ∈ [t, T ], we set
Ft,s = σ{Br −Bt, r ∈ [t, s]} ∨ P,
where P is the set of all null-sets of P .
The processes u and v are assumed to take their values in some compact metric spaces
U and V respectively. We suppose that the functions b : [0, T ] × IRn × U × V → IRn and
σ : [0, T ]× IRn × U × V → IRn×d are continuous and satisfy the assumption (H):
(H) b and σ are bounded and Lipschitz continuous with respect to (t, x), uniformly in
(u, v) ∈ U × V .
We also assume Isaacs’ condition : for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × IRn, p ∈ IRn, and all A ∈ Sn
(where Sn is the set of symmetric n× n matrices) holds:
infu supv{< b(t, x, u, v), p > +
1
2Tr(Aσ(t, x, u, v)σ
∗(t, x, u, v))} =
supv infu{< b(t, x, u, v), p > +
1
2Tr(Aσ(t, x, u, v)σ
∗(t, x, u, v))}
(2.2)
We set H(t, x, p,A) = infu supv{< b(t, x, u, v), p > +
1
2Tr(Aσ(t, x, u, v)σ
∗(t, x, u, v))}.
For t ∈ [0, T ), we denote by C([t, T ], IRn) the set of continuous maps from [t, T ] to IRn.
2.2 Admissible controls.
Definition 2.1 An admissible control u for player I (resp. II) on [t, T ] is a process taking
values in U (resp. V ), progressively measurable with respect to the filtration (Ft,s, s ≥ t).
The set of admissible controls for player I (resp. II) on [t, T ] is denoted by U(t) (resp. V(t)).
We identify two processes u and u in U(t) if P{u = u a.e. in [t, T ]} = 1.
Under assumption (H), for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × IRn and (u, v) ∈ U(t)× V(t), there exists
a unique solution to (2.1) that we denote by Xt,x,u,v. .
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2.3 Strategies.
Definition 2.2 A strategy for player I starting at time t is a Borel-measurable map α :
[t, T ] × C([t, T ], IRn) → U for which there exists δ > 0 such that, ∀s ∈ [t, T ], f, f ′ ∈
C([t, T ], IRn), if f = f ′ on [t, s], then α(·, f) = α(·, f ′) on [t, s+ δ].
We define strategies for player II in a symmetric way and denote by A(t) (resp. B(t)) the
set of strategies for player I (resp. player II).
We have the following existence result :
Lemma 2.1 For all (t, x) in [0, T ]× IRn, for all (α, β) ∈ A(t)×B(t), there exists a unique
couple of controls (u, v) ∈ U(t)× V(t) that satisfies P−a.s.
(u, v) = (α(·,Xt,x,u,v· ), β(·,X
t,x,u,v
· )) on [t, T ]. (2.3)
Proof: The controls u and v will be built step by step. Let δ > 0 be a common delay for α
and β. We can choose δ such that T = t+Nδ for some N ∈ IN∗.
By definition, on [t, t + δ), for all f ∈ C([t, T ], IRn), α(s, f) = α(s, f(t)). Since, for all
(u, v) ∈ U(t)× V(t), Xt,x,u,vt = x, the control u is uniquely defined on [t, t+ δ) by
∀s ∈ [t, t+ δ), u(s) = α(s, x).
The same holds for v, what permits us to define the process Xt,x,u,v· on [t, t+δ) as a solution
of the system (2.1) restricted on the interval [t, t+ δ).
Now suppose that u, v and Xt,x,u,v· are P−a.s. defined uniquely on some interval [t, t+ kδ),
k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. This allows us to set,
∀s ∈ [t+ kδ, t + (k + 1)δ), us = α(s,X
t,x,uk ,vk
· ), vs = β(s,X
t,x,uk ,vk
· ),
where
(uk, vk) =
{
(u, v) on [t, t+ kδ)
(u0, v0) else,
for some arbitrary (u0, v0) ∈ U(t)× V(t).
ConsideringXt,x,u
k,vk
· as a random variable with values in the set of paths C([t, T ), IR
n), it is
clear that the map (s, ω)→ us(ω) (defined on [t+kδ, t+(k+1)δ)×Ω) as the composition of
the Borel measurable application α with the map (s, ω)→ (s,Xt,x,u
k,vk
· (ω)), is a process on
[t+ kδ, t+ (k+1)δ) with measurable paths. Further, the non anticipativity of α guaranties
that, for all s ∈ [t+ kδ, t + (k + 1)δ), us is Ft,t+kδ-measurable and the process u|[t,t+(k+1)δ)
is (Ft,s)-progressively measurable. The same holds of course for v|[t,t+(k+1)δ).
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With (u, v) defined on [t, t + (k + 1)δ), we can now define the process Xt,x,u,v· up to time
t+ (k + 1)δ. This completes the proof by induction. 2
We denote by Xt,x,α,β· the process X
t,x,u,v
· , with (u, v) associated to (α, β) by relation
(2.3).
In the frame of incomplete information it is necessary to introduce random strategies.
In contrast with [5] and [6], where the random probabilities are supposed to be absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, play a random strategy will consist here
to choose some strategy in a finite set of possibilities, i.e. the involved probabilities are
finite. It is not clear if this assumption is more realistic nor if the notation will be lighter,
nevertheless this alternative allows us to avoid some technical steps of measure theory, in a
paper that is already technical enough.
Notation: For R ∈ IN∗, let ∆(R) be the set of all (r1, . . . , rR) ∈ [0, 1]
R that satisfy∑R
n=1 rn = 1.
We define a random strategy α for player I by α = (α1, . . . αR; r1, . . . , rR), with R ∈ IN∗,
(α1, . . . αR) ∈ (A(t))R, (r1, . . . , rR) ∈ ∆(R).
The heuristic interpretation of α¯ is that player I’s strategy amounts to choose the pure
strategy αk with probability rk.
We define in a similar way the random strategies for player II, and denote by Ar(t) (resp.
Br(t)) the set of all random strategies for player I (resp. player II).
Finally, identifying α ∈ A(t) with (α; 1) ∈ Ar(t), we can write A(t) ⊂ Ar(t), and the same
holds for B(t) and Br(t).
2.4 The payoff.
Fix I, J ∈ IN∗.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ I, 1 ≤ j ≤ J , let gij : IR
n → IR be the terminal payoffs. We assume that
For 1 ≤ i ≤ I, 1 ≤ j ≤ J , gij are Lipschitz continuous and bounded. (2.4)
For (p, q) ∈ ∆(I) ×∆(J), with p = (p1, . . . , pI), q = (q1, . . . qJ), we denote with a hat the
elements of (Ar(t))
I (resp. (Br(t))
J ): αˆ = (α1, . . . , αI), βˆ = (β1, . . . , βJ).
We adopt following notations :
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For fixed (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , I} × {1, . . . , J} and strategies (α, β) ∈ A(t) × B(t), the payoff of
the game with only one possible terminal payoff function gij will be denoted by
Jij(t, x, α, β) = E[gij(X
t,x,α,β
T )].
Now let (α, β) ∈ Ar(t)× Br(t) be two random strategies, with α = (α
1, . . . , αR; r1, . . . , rR)
and β = (β1, . . . , βS ; s1, . . . , sS). The payoff associated with the pair (α, β) ∈ Ar(t)×Br(t)),
is the average of the payoffs with respect to the probability distributions associated to the
strategies:
Jij(t, x, α, β) =
R∑
k=1
S∑
l=1
rkslE[gij(X
t,x,αk ,βl
T )].
Further, for p ∈ ∆(I), j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, αˆ ∈ (Ar(t))
I and β ∈ Br(t) we will use the notation
Jpj (t, x, αˆ, β) =
I∑
i=1
piJij(t, x, αi, β) =
I∑
i=1
pi
∑
k,l
rkslE[gij(X
t,x,αki ,β
l
T )].
A symmetric notation holds for α ∈ Ar(t) and βˆ ∈ (Br(t))
J . Finally, the payoff of the
game is, for (αˆ, βˆ) ∈ (Ar(t))
I × (Br(t))
J , p ∈ ∆(I), q ∈ ∆(J),
Jp,q(t, x, αˆ, βˆ) =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjJij(t, x, αi, βj).
The reference to (t, x) in the notations is dropped when there is no possible confusion : we
will write Jij(α, β), Jij(α, β), . . ..
We define the value functions for the game by
V +(t, x, p, q) = infαˆ∈(Ar(t))I supβˆ∈Br(t))J J
p,q(t, x, αˆ, βˆ),
V −(t, x, p, q) = sup
βˆ∈(Br(t))J
inf αˆ∈(Ar(t))I J
p,q(t, x, αˆ, βˆ).
Again we will write V +(p, q) and V −(p, q) if there is no possible confusion on (t, x).
The following lemma follows easily from classical estimations for stochastic differential
equations :
Lemma 2.2 V + and V − are bounded, Lipschitz continuous with respect to x, p, q and
Ho¨lder continuous with respect to t.
Following [3] we now state one of the basic properties of the value functions. The
technique of proof of this statement is known as the splitting method in repeated game
theory (see [3], [16]).
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Proposition 2.1 For all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× IRn, the maps (p, q)→ V +(t, x, p, q) and (p, q)→
V −(t, x, p, q) are convex in p and concave in q.
Proof: We only prove the result for V +, the proof for V − is the same. First V + can be
rewritten as
V +(p, q) = inf
αˆ∈(Ar(t))I
J∑
j=1
qj sup
β∈Br(t)
Jpj (αˆ, β).
It follows that V + is concave in q.
Now fix q ∈ ∆(J) and let p, p′ ∈ ∆(I) and a ∈ (0, 1). Without loss of generality we can
assume that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, pi and p
′
i are not simultaneously equal to zero.
We get a new element of ∆(I) if we set pa = ap+ (1 − a)p′. For ǫ > 0, let αˆ ∈ (Ar(t))
I be
ǫ-optimal for V +(p, q) (resp. αˆ′ ∈ (Ar(t))
I ǫ-optimal for V +(p′, q)).
We define a new strategy αˆa = (αa1, . . . , α
a
I ) by
αai = (α
1
i , . . . , α
R
i , α
′1
i , . . . , α
′R′
i ; (r
a
i )
1, . . . , (rai )
(R+R′)), i ∈ {1, . . . , I},
with
(rai )
k =


api
pai
rki for k ∈ {1, . . . , R},
(1−a)p′i
pai
r′k−Ri for k ∈ {R+ 1, . . . , R+R
′}
(it is easy to check that αˆa ∈ (Ar(t))
I).
This means that, for all βˆ ∈ (Br(t))
J ,
Jp
a,q(αˆa, βˆ) =
I∑
i=1
{
api
R∑
k=1
rki J
q
i (α
k
i , βˆ) + (1− a)p
′
i
R′∑
k=1
r′ki J
q
i (α
′k
i , βˆ)
}
Thus
sup
βˆ∈(Br(t))J
Jp
a,q(αˆa, βˆ) ≤ a sup
βˆ∈(Br(t))J
Jp,q(αˆ, βˆ) + (1− a) sup
βˆ∈(Br(t))J
Jp
′,q(αˆ′, βˆ).
It follows by the choice of αˆ and αˆ′ that
V +(pa, q) ≤ aV +(p, q) + (1− a)V +(p′, q).
2
8
3 Subdynamic programming and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equations for the Fenchel conjugates.
Since V + and V − are convex with respect to p and concave with respect to q, it is natural to
introduce the Fenchel conjugates of these functions. For this we use the following notations.
For any w : [0, T ]× IRn ×∆(I)×∆(J)→ IR, we define the Fenchel conjugate w∗ of w with
respect to p by
w∗(t, x, pˆ, q) = sup
p∈∆(I)
{〈pˆ, p〉 −w(t, x, p, q)}, (t, x, pˆ, q) ∈ [0, T ]× IRn × IRI ×∆(J).
For w defined on the dual space [0, T ]× IRn × IRI ×∆(J), we also set
w∗(t, x, p, q) = sup
pˆ∈IRI
{〈pˆ, p〉 − w(t, x, pˆ, q)}, (t, x, p, q) ∈ [0, T ]× IRn ×∆(I)×∆(J).
It is well known that, if w is convex, we have (w∗)∗ = w.
We also have to introduce the concave conjugate with respect to q of a map w : [0, T ] ×
IRn ×∆(I)×∆(J)→ IR:
w♯(t, x, p, qˆ) = inf
q∈∆(J)
{〈qˆ, q〉 − w(t, x, p, q)}, (t, x, p, qˆ) ∈ [0, T ] × IRn ×∆(I)× IRJ .
We use the following notations for the sub- and superdifferentials with respect to pˆ and qˆ
respectively: if w : [0, T ]× IRn × IRI ×∆(J)→ IR, we set
∂−pˆ w(t, x, pˆ, q) = {p ∈ IR
I , w(t, x, pˆ, q) + 〈p, pˆ′ − pˆ〉 ≤ w(t, x, pˆ′, q) ∀pˆ′ ∈ IRI}
and if w : [0, T ] × IRn ×∆(I)× IRJ → IR
∂+qˆ w(t, x, p, qˆ) = {q ∈ IR
J , w(t, x, p, qˆ) + 〈q, qˆ′ − qˆ〉 ≥ w(t, x, p, qˆ′) ∀qˆ′ ∈ IRJ}.
In this chapter, we will show that V +♯ and V −∗ satisfy a subdynamic programming
property. This part follows several ideas of [10], [11].
Lemma 3.1 (Reformulation of V −∗)
For all (t, x, pˆ, q) ∈ [0, T ] × IRn × IRI ×∆(J), we have
V −∗(t, x, pˆ, q) = inf
βˆ∈(Br(t))J
sup
α∈A(t)
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{
pˆi − J
q
i (t, x, α, βˆ)
}
. (3.5)
Proof. We begin to establish a first expression for V −∗:
V −∗(pˆ, q) = inf
βˆ∈(Br(t))J
sup
α∈Ar(t)
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{
pˆi − J
q
i (α, βˆ)
}
(3.6)
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(the difference with (3.5) is that player I here can use random strategies.)
Let’s denote by e = e(pˆ, q) the right hand term of (3.6). First we prove that e is convex
with respect to pˆ :
Fix q ∈ ∆(J), pˆ, pˆ′ ∈ IRI and a ∈ (0, 1).
For ǫ > 0, let βˆ (resp. βˆ′)∈ (Br(t))
J be some ǫ-optimal strategy for e(pˆ, q) (resp. e(pˆ′, q)).
Set pˆa = apˆ+ (1− a)pˆ′.
We define a new strategy βˆa ∈ (Br(t))
J by
β
a
j = (β
1
j , . . . , β
S
j , β
′1
j , . . . , β
′S′
j ; (s
a
j )
1, . . . , (saj )
S+S′), j ∈ {1, . . . , J},
with
(sa)kj =


askj for k ∈ {1, . . . , S},
(1− a)s′k−Sj k ∈ {S + 1, . . . , S + S
′}.
Let α ∈ Ar(t). Since the application (x1, . . . , xI) → max{xi, i = 1, . . . , I} is convex, we
have
maxi
{
pˆai − J
q
i (α, βˆ
a)
}
= maxi
{
a(pˆi − J
q
i (α, βˆ)) + (1− a)(pˆ
′
i − J
q′
i (α, βˆ
′))
}
≤ a supα∈Ar(t)maxi(pˆi − J
q
i (α, βˆ
a))
+(1− a) supα∈Ar(t)maxi(pˆ
1
i − J
q′
i (α, βˆ
′))
≤ ae(pˆ, q) + (1− a)e(pˆ′, q) + ǫ.
Since ǫ is arbitrary, we can deduce that e is convex with respect to pˆ.
The next step is to prove that e∗ = V −. By the convexity of e, this will imply that V −∗ = e.
We can reorganize e∗(p, q) as follows :
e∗(p, q) = suppˆ∈IRI
{∑I
i=1 pˆipi + supβˆ∈(Br(t))J infα∈Ar(t)mini′∈{1,...,I}{J
q
i′(α, βˆ)− pˆi′}
}
= sup
βˆ∈(Br(t))J
suppˆ∈IRI
∑I
i=1 pimini′∈{1,...,I}
{
infα∈Ar(t) J
q
i′(α, βˆ) + (pˆi − pˆi′)
}
The supremum over pˆ ∈ IRI is attained for pˆi′ = infα∈Ar(t) J
q
i′(α, βˆ) and we get the claimed
result.
Finally, to get (3.5), it remains to show that player I can use non random strategies.
Indeed, writing V −∗ as in (3.6) and since A(t) ⊂ Ar(t), it is obvious that the left hand side
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of (3.5) is not smaller than the right hand side.
Concerning the reverse inequality, we can write
supα∈Ar(t) maxi
{
pˆi − J
q
i (α, β)
}
≤ supR∈IN∗ sup(α1,...,αR)∈(A(t))R ,(r1,...,rR)∈∆(R)
∑R
k=1 r
kmaxi
{
pˆi − J
q
i (α
k, βˆ)
}
≤ supR∈IN∗ sup(r1,...,rR)∈∆(R)
∑
k r
k supα∈A(t)maxi
{
pˆi − J
q
i (α, βˆ)
}
.
The result follows after one recalls that
∑R
k=1 r
k = 1.
2
Proposition 3.1 (Subdynamic programming for V −∗)
For all 0 ≤ t0 ≤ t1 ≤ T, x0 ∈ IR
n, pˆ ∈ IRI , q ∈ ∆(J), it holds that
V −∗(t0, x0, pˆ, q) ≤ inf
β∈B(t0)
sup
α∈A(t0)
E[V −∗(t1,X
t0,x0,α,β
t1
, pˆ, q)].
Proof : Set V −∗1 (t0, t1, x0, pˆ, q) = infβ∈B(t0) supα∈A(t0)E[V
−∗(t1,X
t0,x0,α,β
t1
, pˆ, q)].
For ǫ > 0, let βǫ ∈ B(t0) be ǫ-optimal for V
−∗
1 (t0, t1, x0, pˆ, q), and, for all x ∈ IR
n, let
βˆx ∈ (Br(t1))
J be ǫ-optimal for V −∗(t1, x, pˆ, q). By the uniformly Lipschitz assumptions for
the parameters of the dynamics, there exists R > 0 such that, for all α ∈ A(t0),
P [Xt0,x0,α,β
ǫ
t1
∈ B(x0, R)] ≥ 1− ǫ,
where B(x0, R) denotes the ball in IR
n of center x0 and radius R.
Remark that Jqi and V
−∗ are uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x. This implies that we can
find r > 0 such that, for any x ∈ IRn and y ∈ B(x, r), βˆx is 2ǫ-optimal for V −∗(t1, y, pˆ, q).
Now let x1, . . . , xM ∈ IR
n such that ∪Mm=1B(xm,
r
2) ⊃ B(x0, R).
Set βˆm = βˆxm for m = 1, . . . ,M and choose some arbitrary βˆ0 ∈ (Br(t1))
J .
Each βˆm is detailed in the following way:
βˆm = (β
m
1 , . . . , β
m
J ),
with
β
m
j = (β
m,1
j , . . . , β
m,Smj
j ; s
m,1
j , . . . , s
m,Smj
j ).
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Let δ be a common delay for βˆ0, . . . , βˆM that we can choose as small as we need :
0 < δ < r
2ǫ
4C ∧ (t1 − t0), where C > 0 is defined through the parameters of the dynamics by
∀α ∈ A(t), β ∈ B(t), t, t′ ∈ [t0, T ], E[|X
t0 ,x0,α,β
t −X
t0,x0,α,β
t′ |
2] ≤ C|t− t′|.
We then have in particular, for all α ∈ A(t) and β ∈ B(t),
P [|Xt0,x0,α,βt1 −X
t0,x0,α,β
t1−δ
| >
r
2
] ≤ ǫ. (3.7)
Let (Em)m=1,...,M be a Borel measurable partition of B(x0, R), such that, for all m ∈
{1, . . . ,M}, Em ⊂ B(xm,
r
2). Set E0 = B(x0, R)
c.
We are now able to define a new strategy for player II, βˆǫ ∈ (Br(t0))
J :
Fix j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. For l = (l0, . . . , lM ) ∈ L := Π
M
m=0{1, . . . , S
m
j }, set s
l
j = Π
M
m=0s
m,lm
j .
Remark that {slj , l ∈ L} ∈ ∆(Card(L)).
Then, for l ∈ L, l = (l0, . . . , lM ), we define (β
ǫ
j)
l ∈ B(t0) by
∀f ∈ C([t0, T ], IR
n),∀t ∈ [t0, T ],
(βǫj)
l(t, f) =
{
βǫ(t, f) if t ∈ [t0, t1),
βm,lmj (t, f |[t1,T ]) if t ∈ [t1, T ] and f(t1 − δ) ∈ Em.
We set β
ǫ
j := ((β
ǫ
j)
l; slj, l ∈ L) ∈ Br(t0), and finally βˆ
ǫ = (β
ǫ
1, . . . , β
ǫ
J).
For some fixed α ∈ A(t0) and f ∈ C([t0, t1], IR
n), we define a new strategy αf ∈ A(t1) by:
for all t ∈ [0, T ] and f ′ ∈ C([t1, T ], IR
n),
αf (t, f
′) = α(t, f˜), with f˜(t) =
{
f(t) for t ∈ [t0, t1],
f ′(t)− f ′(t1) + f(t1), for t ∈ (t1, T ].
Set Xǫ· = X
t0,x0,α,β
ǫ
· and, for m ∈ {0, . . . ,M}, Am = {X
ǫ
t1−δ
∈ Em}. Set further
A = {|Xǫt1 − X
ǫ
t1−δ
| ≤ r2}. By (3.7), it holds that P [A
c] ≤ ǫ. Remark also that, on each
A ∩ Am, X
ǫ
t1
belongs to B(xm, r) and consequently, still on A ∩ Am, βˆ
m is 2ǫ-optimal for
V −∗(t1,X
ǫ
t1
, pˆ, q).
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, j ∈ {1, . . . , J} and l ∈ L, we have
E[gij(X
t0,x0,α,(βǫj)
l
T )|Ft1 ] =
M∑
m=0
ıAmE[gij(X
t1,y,αf ,β
m,lm
j
T )]|y=Xǫt1 ,f=X
ǫ
· |[t0,t1]
.
It follows that
Jqi (t0, x0, α, βˆ
ǫ) =
∑J
j=1 qj
∑
l∈L s
l
jE[gij(X
t0,x0,α,(βǫj)
l
T )]
= E[
∑M
m=0 ıAmJ
q
i (t1,X
ǫ
t1
, αXǫ|[t0,t1]
, βˆm)].
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And
maxi∈{1,...,I}
{
pˆi− J
q
i (t0, x0, α, βˆ
ǫ)
}
≤ E[
∑M
m=0 ıAm maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi − J
q
i (t1,X
ǫ
t1
, αXǫ· |[t0,t1]
, βˆm)}]
≤ E[
∑M
m=0 ıAm(supα∈A(t1)maxi∈{1,...,I}{pˆi − J
q
i (t1,X
ǫ
t1
, α, βˆm)})]
≤ E[(V −∗(t1,X
ǫ
t1
, pˆ, q) + 2ǫ)ıA∩{Xǫt1∈B(x0,R)}
]
+maxi∈{1,...,I}{|pˆi|+K}(P [A
c] + P [Xǫt1 6∈ B(x0, R)]),
by the choice of (βˆm,m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}) and where K is an upper bound of |g|.
By the choice of R and with the notation K(pˆ) = 4maxi∈{1,...,I}{|pˆi|+K}+ ǫ, we get
maxi∈{1,...,I}
{
pˆi − J
q
i (t0, x0, α, βˆ
ǫ)
}
≤ E[V −∗(t1,X
ǫ
t1
, pˆ, q) + 2ǫ] +K(pˆ)ǫ
≤ supα∈A(t0)E[V
−∗(t1,X
t0,x0,α,β
ǫ
t1
, pˆ, q)] + 2ǫ(1 +K(pˆ))
≤ V −∗1 (t0, t1, x0, pˆ, q) + ǫ(3 + 2K(pˆ))
(for the last inequality, recall that βǫ was chosen ǫ-optimal for V −∗1 (t0, t1, x0, pˆ, q)).
We can deduce the result. 2
A classical consequence of the subdynamic programming principle for V −∗ is that this
function is a subsolution of some associated Hamilton-Jacobi equation. We give a proof of
that result for sake of completeness.
Corollary 3.1 For any (pˆ, q) ∈ IRI ×∆(J), V −∗(·, ·, pˆ, q) is a subsolution in the viscosity
sense of
wt +H
−∗(t, x,Dw,D2w) = 0, (t, x) ∈ (0, T )× IRn,
with
H−∗(t, x, p,A) = −H−(t, x,−p,−A) =
infv∈V supu∈U{〈b(t, x, u, v), p〉 +
1
2Tr(Aσ(t, x, u, v)σ
∗(t, x, u, v))}.
(3.8)
Proof : For (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]× IR
n, pˆ ∈ IRI , q ∈ ∆(J) fixed, let φ ∈ C1,2 such that φ(t0, x0) =
V −∗(t0, x0, pˆ, q) and, for all (s, y) ∈ [0, T ]× IR
n, φ(s, y) ≥ V −∗(s, y, pˆ, q).
We have to prove that
φt(t0, x0) +H
−∗(t0, x0,Dφ(t0, x0),D
2(t0, x0)) ≥ 0.
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Suppose that this is false and consider θ > 0 such that
φt(t0, x0) +H
−∗(t0, x0,Dφ(t0, x0),D
2(t0, x0)) ≤ −θ < 0. (3.9)
Set Λ(t, x, u, v) = φt(t, x) + 〈b(t, x, u, v),Dφ(t, x)〉 + Tr(D
2φ(t, x)σ(t, x, u, v)σ∗(t, x, u, v)).
Since, for fixed pˆ, V −∗ is bounded, we can choose φ such that φt and D
2φ are also bounded.
It follows that, for some K > 0, we have |Λ(t, x, u, v)| ≤ K.
Now the relation (3.9) is equivalent to
inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
Λ(t0, x0, u, v) ≤ −θ .
This implies the existence of a control v0 ∈ V such that, for all u ∈ U ,
Λ(t0, x0, u, v0) ≤ −
2θ
3
.
Moreover, since Λ is continuous in (t, x), uniformly in u, v, we can find R > 0 such that,
∀(t, x) ∈ [t0, T ]× IR
n, |t− t0| ∨ ‖x− x0‖ < R,∀u ∈ U,Λ(t, x, u, v0) ≤ −
θ
2
. (3.10)
Now define a strategy for player II by β0(t, f) = v0 for all (t, f) ∈ [t0, T ]×C([t0, T ], IR
n).
Fix ǫ > 0 and t ∈ (t0, R). Because of the subdynamical programming (Proposition 3.1),
there exists αǫ,t ∈ A(t0) such that
E[V −∗(t1,X
t0,x0,αǫ,t,β0
t1
, pˆ, q)]− V −∗(t0, x0, pˆ, q) ≥ −ǫ(t− t0). (3.11)
Let (us, vs) ∈ U(t0) × V(t0) the controls associated to (αǫ,t, β0) by the relation (2.3) and
set X· = X
t0,x0,αǫ,t,β0
· = X
t0,x0,u,v
· . (Remark that, by the choice of β0, (vs) is constant and
equal to v0.)
Now we write Itoˆ’s formula for φ(t,Xt):
φ(t,Xt)− φ(t0, x0) =
∫ t
t0
Λ(s,Xs, us, vs)ds
+
∫ t
t0
〈Dφ(s,Xs), b(s,Xs, us, vs)〉dBs.
(3.12)
By (3.11), (3.12) and the definition of φ, we have
E[
∫ t
t0
Λ(s,Xs, us, vs)ds] ≥ −ǫ(t− t0). (3.13)
In the other hand, there exists a constant C > 0 depending only on the parameters of X,
such that
P [‖X· − x0‖t > R] ≤
C(t− t0)
2
R4
,
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with the notation ‖f‖t = sups∈[t0,t] ‖f(s)‖.
Following (3.10), this implies that, for all t ∈ [t0, T ∧ (t0 +R)],
E
[
I{‖X·−x0‖t<R}
∫ t
t0
Λ(s,Xs, us, vs)ds
]
≤ −
θ
2
(t− t0). (3.14)
By (3.13) and (3.14), we now have
−ǫ(t− t0) ≤ E[
∫ t
t0
Λ(s,Xs, us, vs)dsI{‖X·−x0‖t>R}] + E[
∫ t
t0
Λ(s,Xs, us, vs)dsI{‖X·−x0‖t≤R}]
≤ KC
R4
(t− t0)
2 − θ2(t− t0),
or, equivalently,
θ
2
≤
KC
R4
(t− t0) + ǫ.
Since t− t0 and ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily small, we get a contradiction. 2
For V + we have:
Proposition 3.2 (Superdynamic programming and HJI equation for V +♯)
For all 0 ≤ t0 ≤ t1 ≤ T, x0 ∈ IR
n, p ∈ ∆(I), qˆ ∈ IRJ , it holds that
V +♯(t0, x0, p, qˆ) ≥ inf
β∈B(t0)
sup
α∈A(t0)
E[V +♯(t1,X
t0,x0,α,β
t1
, p, qˆ)].
As a consequence, for any (p, qˆ) ∈ ∆(I) × IRJ , V +♯(·, ·, p, qˆ) is a supersolution in viscosity
sense of
wt +H
+∗(t, x,Dw,D2w)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ (0, T ) × IRn,
where
H+∗(t, x, p,A) = −H+(t, x,−p,−A) =
supu∈U infv∈V {〈b(t, x, u, v), p〉 +
1
2Tr(Aσ(t, x, u, v)σ
∗(t, x, u, v))}.
(3.15)
Proof : We note that V + is equal to the opposite of the lower value of the game
in which we replace gij by −gij , Player I is the maximizer and in which the respective
roles of p and q are exchanged. Using Proposition 3.1 in this framework gives the superdy-
namic programming principle. Now Corollary 3.1 shows that, for any (p, qˆ) ∈ ∆(I) × IRJ ,
(−V +)∗(·, ·, p, qˆ) = −V +♯(·, ·, p,−qˆ) is a subsolution of
wt +H
+(t, x,Dw,D2w)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ (0, T )× IRn.
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Hence V +♯(·, ·, p,−qˆ) is a supersolution of
wt +H
+∗(t, x,Dw,D2w)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ (0, T ) × IRn.
Since this holds true for any (p, qˆ), this proves our claim. 2
4 Comparison principle and existence of a value
In this section we first state a new comparison principle and apply it to get the existence
and the characterization of the value. Then we give a proof for the comparison principle.
4.1 Statement of the comparison principle and existence of a value
Let H : [0, T ]× IRn × IRn × Sn ×∆(I)×∆(J)→ IR be continuous and satisfy
H(s, y, ξ2,X2, p, q)−H(t, x, ξ1,X1, p, q) ≥
−ω
(
|ξ1 − ξ2|+ a|(t, x)− (s, y)|
2 + b+ |(t, x)− (s, y)|(1 + |ξ1|+ |ξ2|)
) (4.16)
where ω is continuous and non decreasing with ω(0) = 0, for any a, b ≥ 0, (p, q) ∈ ∆(I) ×
∆(J), s, t ∈ [0, T ], x, y, ξ1, x2 ∈ IR
n and X1,X2 ∈ Sn such that(
−X1 0
0 X2
)
≤ a
(
I −I
−I I
)
+ bI
Definition 4.1 We say that a map w : (0, T )× IRn×∆(I)×∆(J)→ IR is a supersolution
in the dual sense of equation
wt +H(t, x,Dw,D
2w, p, q) = 0 (4.17)
if w = w(t, x, p, q) is lower semicontinuous, concave with respect to q and if, for any
C2((0, T ) × IRn) function φ such that (t, x) → w∗(t, x, pˆ, q¯) − φ(t, x) has a maximum at
some point (t¯, x¯) for some (pˆ, q¯) ∈ IRI ×∆(J), we have
φt(t¯, x¯)−H(t¯, x¯,−Dφ(t¯, x¯),−D
2φ(t¯, x¯), p, q¯) ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ ∂−pˆ w
∗(t¯, x¯, pˆ, q¯) .
We say that w is a subsolution of (4.17) in the dual sense if w is upper semicontinuous,
convex with respect to p and if, for any C2((0, T ) × IRn) function φ such that (t, x) →
w♯(t, x, p¯, qˆ)− φ(t, x) has a minimum at some point (t¯, x¯) for some (p¯, qˆ) ∈ ∆(I)× IRJ , we
have
φt(t¯, x¯)−H(t¯, x¯,−Dφ(t¯, x¯),−D
2φ(t¯, x¯), p¯, q) ≤ 0 ∀q ∈ ∂+qˆ w
♯(t¯, x¯, p¯, qˆ) .
16
A solution of (4.17) in the dual sense is a map which is sub- and supersolution in the dual
sense.
Remarks :
1. We have proved in Corollary 3.1 that V − is a dual supersolution of the HJ equation
wt +H
−(t, x,Dw,D2w) = 0 ,
whereH− is defined by (3.8), while Proposition 3.2 shows that V + is a dual subsolution
of the HJ equation
wt +H
+(t, x,Dw,D2w) = 0 ,
where H− is defined by (3.15).
2. The necessity to deal with a Hamiltonian H with a (p, q) dependence will become
clear in the next section where we study differential games with running costs.
3. An equivalent definition of the notion of dual super- or subsolution in given in Lemma
5.3 below.
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 4.1 (Comparison principle) Let us assume that H satisfies the structure con-
dition (4.16). Let w1 be a bounded, Ho¨lder continuous subsolution of (4.17) in the dual sense
which is uniformly Lipschitz continuous w.r. to q and w2 be a bounded, Ho¨lder continuous
supersolution of (4.17) in the dual sense which is uniformly Lipschitz continuous w.r. to p.
Assume that
w1(T, x, p, q) ≤ w2(T, x, p, q) ∀(x, p, q) ∈ IR
n ×∆(I)×∆(J) . (4.18)
Then
w1(t, x, p, q) ≤ w2(t, x, p, q) ∀(t, x, p, q) ∈ [0, T ]× IR
n ×∆(I)×∆(J) .
Remark : For simplicity we are assuming here that w1 and w2 are Ho¨lder continuous
and bounded. These assumptions could be relaxed by standard (but painfull) techniques.
We do not know if the uniform Lipschitz continuity assumption on w1 with respect to q and
on w2 with respect to p can be relaxed.
As a consequence we have
17
Theorem 4.2 (Existence of a value) Under assumptions (H), (2.4) and (2.2), the game
has a value:
V +(t, x, p, q) = V −(t, x, p, q) ∀(t, x, p, q) ∈ (0, T )× IRn ×∆(I)×∆(J) .
Furthermore V + = V − is the unique solution in the dual sense of HJI equation (4.17) with
terminal condition
V +(T, x, p, q) = V −(T, x, p, q) =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjgij(x) ∀(x, p, q) ∈ IR
n ×∆(I)×∆(J) .
Proof of Theorem 4.2 : The Hamiltonian H defined by (2.2) is known to satisfy
(4.16) (see [9] for instance). ¿From the definition of V + and V − we have V − ≤ V +. We
have proved in Lemma 2.2 and Proposition 2.1 that V + and V − are Ho¨lder continuous,
Lipschitz continuous with respect to p and q, convex w.r. to p and concave w.r. to q. From
Corollary 3.1 we know that V − is a supersolution of (4.17) in the dual sense while Propo-
sition 3.2 states that V + is a supersolution of that same equation in the dual sense. The
comparison principle then states that V + ≤ V −, whence the existence and the characteriza-
tion of the value: V + = V − is the unique solution in the dual sense of HJI equation (4.17). 2
4.2 Proof of the comparison principle
The proof of Theorem 4.1 relies on two arguments: first on a reformulation of the notions of
sub- and supersolutions by using sub- and superjets; second on a new maximum principle
described in the appendix.
Let us recall the notions of sub- and superjets of a function w : (0, T ) × IRn → IR: the
subjet D2,−w(t¯, x¯) is the set of (ξt, ξx,X) ∈ IR
n+1 × Sn such that
w(t, x) ≥ w(t¯, x¯) + ξt(t− t¯) + ξx.(x− x¯) +
1
2
X(x− x¯).(x− x¯) + o(|t− t¯|+ |x− x¯|2)}
and the superjet D2,+w is given by
D2,+w(t¯, x¯) = −D2,−(−w)(t¯, x¯)
When w depends on other variables ((p, q) or (p, qˆ) for instance), D2,−w and D2,+w always
denote the sub- and superjets with respect to the (t, x) variables only. For w = w(t, x, p, qˆ),
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we set
D2,−w(t¯, x¯, p, qˆ) =


(ξt, ξx,X) ∈ IR
n+1 × Sn , ∃(tn, xn, pn, qˆn)→ (t¯, x¯, p, qˆ),
∃(ξnt , ξ
n
x ,X
n) ∈ D2,−w(tn, xn, pn, qˆn)
with (ξnt , ξ
n
x ,X
n)→ (ξt, ξx,X)

 .
We use a symmetric notation for D2,+w(t¯, x¯, pˆ, q).
The following equivalent formulation of the notion of sub- and supersolution is standard
in viscosity solution theory, so we omit the proof:
Proposition 4.3 A map w : (0, T )× IRn×∆(I)×∆(J)→ IR is a supersolution of equation
(4.17) in the dual sense if and only if w = w(t, x, p, q) is lower semicontinuous, concave
with respect to q and if, for any (t¯, x¯, pˆ, q¯) and any (ξt, ξx,X) ∈ D2,+w
∗(t¯, x¯, pˆ, q¯) we have
ξt −H(t¯, x¯,−ξx,−X, p, q¯) ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ ∂
−
pˆ w
∗(t¯, x¯, pˆ, q¯) .
Symmetrically w is a subsolution of (4.17) in the dual sense if and only if w is upper
semicontinuous, convex with respect to p and if, for any (t¯, x¯, p¯, qˆ) and any (ξt, ξx,X) ∈
D2,−w♯(t¯, x¯, p¯, qˆ) we have
ξt −H(t¯, x¯,−ξx,−X, p¯, q) ≤ 0 ∀q ∈ ∂
+
qˆ w
♯(t¯, x¯, p¯, qˆ) .
Proof of Theorem 4.1 : Let us assume that
sup
t,x,p,q
(w1 − w2) > 0 .
Since w1 and w2 are Ho¨lder continuous and bounded, classical arguments show that
Mǫ,η,α := sup
t,x,s,y,p,q
{
w1(t, x, p, q) − w2(s, y, p, q)− (
|(t, x) − (s, y)|2
2ǫ
+
α
2
(|x|2 + |y|2)) + ηt
}
is finite and achieved at a point (t¯, x¯, s¯, y¯, p¯0, q¯0). One can also show that
lim
ǫ,η,α→0+
Mǫ,η,α = sup
t,x,p,q
(w1 − w2) (4.19)
and that
|(t¯, x¯)− (s¯, y¯)|2
ǫ2
, α|x¯|2 , α|y¯|2 ≤ 2M∞ (4.20)
where M∞ = |w1|∞ + |w2|∞. Using (4.18) and the Ho¨lder continuity of w1 and w2 shows
that t¯ < T and s¯ < T as soon as ǫ, η and α are small enough.
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¿From the maximum principle (Theorem 6.1 stated in the Appendix), there are (p¯, q¯),
(pˆ, qˆ) and X1,X2 ∈ Sn such that
p¯ ∈ ∂−pˆ w
∗
2(s¯, y¯, pˆ, q¯), q¯ ∈ ∂
−
qˆ w
♯
2(t¯, x¯, p¯, qˆ) ,
(−
(t¯− s¯)
ǫ
+ η,−
(x¯− y¯)
ǫ
− αx¯,X1) ∈ D2,−w
♯
1(s¯, x¯, p¯, qˆ) ,
(
(s¯− t¯)
ǫ
,
(y¯ − x¯)
ǫ
− αy¯,X2) ∈ D2,+w
∗
2(s¯, y¯, pˆ, q¯)
and (
−X1 0
0 X2
)
≤ (
3
ǫ
+ 2α)
(
I −I
−I I
)
+ (α+ α2ǫ)I (4.21)
Since w1 is a subsolution of (4.17) in the dual sense and q¯ ∈ ∂
−
qˆ w
♯
2(t¯, x¯, p¯, qˆ), Proposition
4.3 states that
η −
t¯− s¯
ǫ
−H
(
t¯, x¯,
x¯− y¯
ǫ
+ αx¯,−X1, p¯, q¯
)
≤ 0 . (4.22)
In the same way, since w2 is a supersolution of (4.17) in the dual sense and p¯ ∈ ∂
−
pˆ w
∗
2(s¯, y¯, pˆ, q¯),
we have
(s¯− t¯)
ǫ
−H
(
s¯, y¯,−
(y¯ − x¯)
ǫ
+ αy¯,−X2, p¯, q¯
)
≥ 0 , (4.23)
Using the structure condition (4.16) on H, and plugging estimates (4.19), (4.20) and
(4.21) into (4.22) and (4.23) yields to a contradiction for ǫ, α and η sufficiently small as in
[9]. 2
5 Games with running cost
We now investigate differential games with asymmetric information on the running cost and
on the terminal cost. The framework is basically the same as before. At the initial time,
the cost (now consisting in a running cost and a terminal one) is chosen at random among
I × J possible costs. The index i is announced to Player I while the index j is announced
to Player II. Then the players play the game in order, for Player I to minimize the payoff
and for Player II to maximize it.
In this section we keep the same terminology and the same notations as in the previous
part. There is however a main difference: as we shall see later, in a game with a running
cost, each player needs the knowledge of this running cost to build his strategy. Since
we assume that the running cost depends on the control of both players, this means that
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the players have to observe the control of their opponent. This was not the case of the
game before where the players only observed the state of the system. For this reason we
have to change the notion of strategy: in this section the notion of strategies introduced in
Definition 2.2 is replaced by the following one:
Definition 5.1 A strategy for player I starting at time t is a Borel-measurable map α :
[t, T ] × C([t, T ], IRn) × L2([t, T ], V ) → U for which there exists δ > 0 such that, for all
s ∈ [t, T ], f, f ′ ∈ C([t, T ], IRn) and g, g′ ∈ L2([t, T ], V ), if f = f ′ and g = g′ a.e. on [t, s],
then α(·, f, g) = α(·, f ′, g′) on [t, s+ δ].
We define strategies for player II in a symmetric way and denote by A(t) (resp. B(t)) the
set of strategies for player I (resp. player II).
We define random strategies as before (but with the modified notion of strategies) and still
denote by Ar(t) (resp. Br(t)) the set of random strategies for player I (resp. player II).
We have an analogue of Lemma 2.1 :
Lemma 5.1 For all (t, x) in [0, T ]× IRn, for all (α, β) ∈ A(t)×B(t), there exists a unique
couple of controls (u, v) ∈ U(t)× V(t) that satisfies P−a.s.
(u, v) = (α(·,Xt,x,u,v· , v·), β(·,X
t,x,u,v
· , u·)) a.e. on [t, T ]. (5.24)
One can easily check that the results of the previous parts (i.e., 2.2, Proposition 2.1,
Corollary 3.1 and Proposition 3.2) still hold true with the modified notion of strategy. In
particular, the game with terminal payoff studied before has a value.
Let us fix I, J ∈ IN. For 1 ≤ i ≤ I and 1 ≤ j ≤ J we consider the terminal cost gij : IR
n → IR
and the running cost ℓij : [0, T ]×IR
n×U×V → IR on which we do the following assumptions:
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ I and 1 ≤ j ≤ J , ℓij and gij are continuous in all variables,
uniformly Lipschitz continuous with respect to x and bounded.
(5.25)
For fixed (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , I} × {1, . . . , J} and strategies (α, β) ∈ A(t)× B(t), we set
Jij(t, x, α, β) = E[
∫ T
t
ℓij(s,X
t,x,α,β
s , αs, βs)ds + gij(X
t,x,α,β
T )] ,
where as before (α, β) denotes the unique pair of controls such that (5.24) holds.
The payoff of two random strategies (α, β) ∈ Ar(t)×Br(t), with α = (α
1, . . . , αR; r1, . . . , rR)
and β = (β1, . . . , βS ; s1, . . . , sS), is the average of the payoffs with respect to the probability
distributions associated to the strategies:
Jij(t, x, α, β) =
R∑
k=1
S∑
l=1
rkslE[
∫ T
t
ℓij(s,X
t,x,αk ,βl
s , α
k
s , β
l
s)ds+ gij(X
t,x,αk ,βl
T )].
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Finally, the payoff of the game is, for (αˆ, βˆ) = ((α¯i)1≤i≤I , (β¯j)1≤j≤J) ∈ (Ar(t))
I × (Br(t))
J ,
Jp,q(t, x, αˆ, βˆ) =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjJij(t, x, αi, βj).
We define the value functions for the game with running cost as before by
V +(t, x, p, q) = infαˆ∈(Ar(t))I supβˆ∈Br(t))J J
p,q(t, x, αˆ, βˆ),
V −(t, x, p, q) = sup
βˆ∈(Br(t))J
inf αˆ∈(Ar(t))I J
p,q(t, x, αˆ, βˆ).
In our game with running cost, Isaacs’ assumption takes the following form: for all
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× IRn, (p, q) ∈ ∆(I)×∆(J), ξ ∈ IRn, and all A ∈ Sn:
infu supv{< b(t, x, u, v), ξ > +
1
2Tr(Aσ(t, x, u, v)σ
∗(t, x, u, v)) −
∑
i,j ℓij(t, x, u, v)piqj} =
supv infu{< b(t, x, u, v), ξ > +
1
2Tr(Aσ(t, x, u, v)σ
∗(t, x, u, v)) −
∑
i,j ℓij(t, x, u, v)piqj}
(5.26)
We set
H(t, x, ξ,A, p, q) = infu supv{< b(t, x, u, v), ξ >
+12Tr(Aσ(t, x, u, v)σ
∗(t, x, u, v)) −
∑
i,j ℓij(t, x, u, v)piqj} .
Theorem 5.2 Assume that (H), (5.25) and (5.26) hold. Then the game has a value:
V + = V −, which is the unique solution in the dual sense of
wt +H(t, x,Dw,D
2w, p, q) = 0 (5.27)
with terminal condition
V +(T, x, p, q) = V −(T, x, p, q) =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjgij(x) ∀(x, p, q) ∈ IR
n ×∆(I)×∆(J) .
In order to prove Theorem 5.2 it will be convenient to have the following equivalent
definition of dual solutions of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (5.27):
Lemma 5.3 Let w : [0, T ] × IRN ×∆(I)×∆(J) 7→ IR be lower-semicontinuous, uniformly
Lipschitz continuous with respect to p and concave with respect to q. Then the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) w is a dual supersolution of (5.27).
(ii) for any (pˆ, q¯) ∈ IRI ×∆(J), for any C2 test function φ = φ(t, x) such that
(t, x, p) 7→ w(t, x, p, q¯)− φ(t, x)− 〈pˆ, p〉
has a global minimum at some point (t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈ [0, T )× IRN ×∆(I), we have
φt(t¯, x¯) +H(t¯, x¯,Dφ(t¯, x¯, p¯),D
2φ(t¯, x¯, p¯), p¯, q¯) ≤ 0 . (5.28)
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Remark : A symmetric statement holds for dual subsolutions.
Proof of Lemma 5.3 : Let us assume that w is a supersolution and let φ ∈ C2,
(pˆ, q¯) ∈ IRI ×∆(J) such that
(t, x, p) 7→ w(t, x, p, q¯)− φ(t, x) − 〈pˆ, p〉 (5.29)
has a global minimum at some point (t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈ [0, T )×IRN×∆(I). We note that this implies
that p¯ ∈ ∂−pˆ w
∗(t¯, x¯, pˆ, q¯). Moreover, taking the supremum over p in (5.29), we have that
(t, x) → −φ(t, x) − w∗(t, x, pˆ, q¯) has a global minimum at (t¯, x¯). Since w∗ is a subsolution
of the dual equation, we get
−φt +H
∗(t¯, x¯,−Dφ,−D2φ, p¯, q¯) ≥ 0
at (t¯, x¯), because p¯ ∈ ∂−pˆ w
∗(t¯, x¯, pˆ, q¯). Whence inequality (5.28).
Conversely let us assume that w satisfies (ii). Let φ be a C2 test function such that
(t, x) → w∗(t, x, pˆ, q¯) − φ(t, x) has a maximum at some point (t¯, x¯) ∈ (0, T ) × IRN for
some (pˆ, q¯) ∈ IRI × ∆(J). Without loss of generality we can assume that this maximum
is a global one. Let p¯ ∈ ∂−pˆ w
∗(t¯, x¯, pˆ, q¯). ¿From the definition of w∗, we also have that
(t, x, p) → 〈pˆ, p〉 − w(t, x, p, q¯) − φ(t, x) has a global maximum at (t¯, x¯, p¯), i.e., (t, x, p) →
w(t, x, p, q¯) + φ(t, x)− 〈pˆ, p〉 has a global minimum at (t¯, x¯, p¯). From (5.28) we get
−φt +H(t¯, x¯,−Dφ,−D
2φ, p¯, q¯) ≤ 0 ,
the desired inequality. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.2 : Following standard arguments, one first checks that V +
and V − are globally Ho¨lder continuous, and uniformly Lipschitz continuous with respect
to p and q. In order to prove other properties of the value functions, let us introduce an
extended differential game in IRn+IJ . This game with asymmetric information and terminal
payoff is defined by the dynamics
dXs = b(s,Xs, us, vs)ds+ σ(s,Xs, us, vs)dBs, s ∈ [t, T ],
dZij,s = ℓij(s,Xs, us, vs)ds,
Xt = x, Zij,t = zij ,
(5.30)
where (t, x, z) ∈ [0, T ]× IRn× IRIJ , with z = (zij), and the terminal g˜ij(x, z) = z
ij + gij(x).
We denote by V˜ + and V˜ − the upper and lower value of this game. We note that
V˜ ±(t, x, z, p, q) = V ±(t, x, p, q) +
∑
ij
zijpiqj . (5.31)
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Following the proofs of Proposition 2.1, one can check that V˜ + and V˜ − are convex in p
and concave in q. Hence so are V + and V −. As in Corollary 3.1 and Proposition 3.2, one
can also show that V˜ − is a dual supersolution of the HJ equation
w˜t + H˜
−(t, x, z,Dx,zw,D
2
xw) = 0
where, for (t, x, z) ∈ IRn+IJ , ξx ∈ IR
n, ξz ∈ IR
IJ and A ∈ Sn,
H˜−(t, x, z, ξx, ξz, A) = supv∈V infu∈U{< b(t, x, u, v), ξx >
+12Tr(Aσ(t, x, u, v)σ
∗(t, x, u, v)) +
∑
i,j ℓij(t, x, u, v)ξz,ij},
while V˜ + is a dual subsolution of the HJ equation
w˜t + H˜
+(t, x, z,Dx,zw,D
2
xw) = 0
where
H˜+(t, x, z, ξx, ξz, A) = infu∈U supv∈V {< b(t, x, u, v), ξx >
+12Tr(Aσ(t, x, u, v)σ
∗(t, x, u, v)) +
∑
i,j ℓij(t, x, u, v)ξz,ij}.
Note that this is precisely at this point that the players have to use the new definition of
strategies. Indeed, in order to build their strategies in the sub- and superdynamic program-
ming, they have to compute the running costs Zij (see the proof of Proposition 3.1). This
is possible since, at time s, they know the controls u· and v· and the trajectory X· up to
time s− δ, and therefore can compute Zij,s = zij +
∫ s
t
ℓij(τ,Xτ , uτ , vτ )dτ .
Using Lemma 5.3 one can then show that V − is a dual supersolution of the HJ equation
wt +H
−(t, x,Dw,D2w, p, q) = 0
where
H−(t, x, ξ,A, p, q) = supv∈V infu∈U{< b(t, x, u, v), ξx >
+12Tr(Aσ(t, x, u, v)σ
∗(t, x, u, v)) +
∑
i,j ℓij(t, x, u, v)piqj}
while V + is a dual subsolution of the HJ equation
wt +H
+(t, x,Dw,D2w, p, q) = 0
where
H+(t, x, ξ,A, p, q) = infu∈U supv∈V {< b(t, x, u, v), ξx >
+12Tr(Aσ(t, x, u, v)σ
∗(t, x, u, v)) +
∑
i,j ℓij(t, x, u, v)piqj}
Finally combining Isaacs’ assumption, which states that H := H+ = H−, the fact that H
satisfies assumption (4.16) and the comparison principle shows that V + = V − is the unique
dual solution of (5.27). 2
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6 Appendix : A maximum principle
The following result—used in a crucial way in the proof of the comparison principle—is an
adaptation to our framework of the maximum principle for semicontinuous functions (see
Theorem 3.2 of [9]):
Theorem 6.1 (Maximum principle) For k = 1, 2, let Ok be open subsets of IR
nk and
wk : Ok ×∆(I)×∆(J)→ IR be such that
(i) w1 = w1(x, p, q) is upper semicontinuous in all variables, convex with respect to p and
uniformly Lipschitz continuous with respect to q,
(ii) w2 = w2(y, p, q) is lower semicontinuous in all its variables, concave with respect to q
and uniformly Lipschitz continuous with respect to p,
(iii) there is some C2 map φ : O1 × O2 → IR and some point (x¯, y¯) ∈ O1 × O2 such that
the map
(x, y)→ max
p,q
{w1(x, p, q) −w2(y, p, q)− φ(x, y)}
has a maximum at (x¯, y¯).
Then, for any ǫ > 0, there are (p¯, q¯) ∈ ∆(I)×∆(J), (pˆ, qˆ) ∈ IRI × IRJ and (X1,X2) ∈
Sn1 × Sn2 such that the map
(x, y, p, q)→ w1(x, p, q)− w2(y, p, q) − φ(x, y)
has a maximum at (x¯, y¯, p¯, q¯),
p¯ ∈ ∂−pˆ w
∗
2(y¯, pˆ, q¯), q¯ ∈ ∂
−
qˆ w
♯
1(x¯, p¯, qˆ) , (6.32)
(−Dxφ(x¯, y¯),X1) ∈ D2,−w
♯
1(x¯, p¯, qˆ), (Dyφ(x¯, y¯),X2) ∈ D
2,+w∗2(y¯, pˆ, q¯) (6.33)
and (
1
ǫ
+ ‖A‖
)
I ≤
(
−X1 0
0 X2
)
≤ A+ ǫA2 (6.34)
with A = D2φ(x¯, y¯).
Remark : Compared with the classical maximum principle, the additional difficulty
here is the fact that we need elements of D2,−w♯1 and of D
2,+w∗2 while we have only infor-
mation on the behavior of the difference w1 − w2 − φ.
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Proof of Theorem 6.1 : We follow closely the proof of Theorem 3.2 of [9]. Let us
start by some reductions:
Reductions : As in [9], we can assume without loss of generality that Ok = IR
nk ,
x¯ = y¯ = 0 and φ(x, y) = A(x, y).(x, y) and
max
x,y,p,q
{w1(x, p, q)− w2(y, p, q)− φ(x, y)} = 0 . (6.35)
We can also assume that, for any (p¯′, q¯′) ∈ ∆(I)×∆(J),
if (x¯, y¯, p¯′, q¯′) is a maximum point of w1 − w2 − φ,
then (p¯′, q¯′) belongs to the interior of ∆(I)×∆(J).
(6.36)
Indeed, let us assume that Theorem 6.1 holds true under this additionnal assumption and
let us prove that it holds true without. Let
z(x, y, p, q) = w1(x, p, q) − w2(y, p, q)− φ(x, y) .
Among the (p, q) for which z(x¯, y¯, p, q) has a maximum, let us choose (p¯0, q¯0) such that the
total number of indices i and j for which (p¯0)i = 0 or (q¯0)j = 0 is maximal. Let us denote
by I ′ and J ′ the set of indices i and j for which (p¯0)i > 0 and (q¯0)j > 0. We then define
w′1, w
′
2, z
′, p¯′0 and q¯
′
0 as the natural restriction of w1, w2, z, p¯0 and q¯0 to ∆(I
′) and ∆(J ′).
We note that (x¯, y¯, p¯′0, q¯
′
0) is a maximum point of z on IR
n1+n2 × ∆(I ′) × ∆(J ′) and that
assumption (6.36) holds, since otherwise one would have a contradiction with the particular
choice of (p¯0, q¯0).
Using now Theorem 6.1 with assumption (6.36), we can build (p¯′, q¯′) ∈ ∆(I ′) ×∆(J ′),
qˆ′ ∈ ∂+q w1(x¯, p¯
′, q¯′), pˆ′ ∈ ∂−p w2(y¯, p¯
′, q¯′) and (X1,X2) ∈ Sn1 × Sn2 such that (6.32), (6.33)
and (6.34) hold. Then we extend (p¯′, q¯′) to (p¯, q¯) ∈ ∆(I) × ∆(J) by setting p¯i = p¯
′
i for
i ∈ I ′ and p¯i = 0 otherwise, and q¯j = q¯j for j ∈ J
′ and q¯j = 0 otherwise. We also extend
qˆ′ to qˆ ∈ ∂+q w1(x¯, p¯, q¯) and qˆ
′ to qˆ ∈ ∂+q w1(x¯, p¯, q¯) by setting qˆj = M for j ∈ J\J
′ and
pˆi = −M for i ∈ I\I
′, where M is a Lipschitz constant of w1 and w2 with respect to q and
p respectively. This defines p¯, q¯, qˆ, pˆ and (X1,X2) for which (6.32), (6.33) and (6.34) hold.
So it remains to prove that Theorem 6.1 holds true under the additional assumption
(6.36).
Step 1 : introduction of the inf- and supconvolutions. As in [9], we have
(w1(x
′, p, q)−
λ
2
|x′ − x|2)− (w2(y
′, p, q)−
λ
2
|y′ − y|2) ≤ 〈(A+ ǫA2)(x, y), (x, y)〉
26
for any (x, x′, y, y′, p, q), where λ = 1
ǫ
+ ‖A‖. Let us set for λ′ ∈ (0, λ),
wˆ1(x, p, q) = max
x′∈IRn1 , q′∈∆(J)
(w1(x
′, p, q′)−
λ
2
|x′ − x|2 −
λ′
2
|q′ − q|2)
and
wˆ2(y, p, q) = min
y′∈IRn2 , p′∈∆(I)
(w2(y
′, p′, q) +
λ
2
|y′ − y|2 +
λ′
2
|p′ − p|2) .
With these definition we have that wˆ1 is semiconvex in all its variables with a modulus λ
′,
semiconvex in x with a modulus λ and convex in p (because w1 is convex in p by assumption).
In the same way, wˆ2 is semiconcave in all its variables with a modulus λ
′, semiconvex in y
with a modulus λ and concave in q (because w2 is concave in q by assumption). Moreover
wˆ1(x, p, q)− wˆ2(y, p, q)− 〈(A+ ǫA
2)(x, y), (x, y)〉 ≤ 0 ∀(x, y, p, q) . (6.37)
Since w1 ≤ wˆ1 and w2 ≥ wˆ2, there are some (p, q) such that equality holds in (6.37) at
(0, 0, p, q). Furthermore, if equality holds at (0, 0, p, q), then (0, 0, p, q) is a maximum point
in (6.35) and assumption (6.36) states that (p, q) belongs to the interior of ∆(I)×∆(J).
Step 2 : use of Jensen maximum principle. Let us now introduce some small pertu-
bation of the equation: for α > 0 and ζ = (ζx, ζy, ζp, ζq) ∈ IR
n1+n2+I+J , we set
zζ(x, y, p, q) = wˆ1(x, p, q)− wˆ2(y, p, q)− (A+ ǫA
2)(x, y).(x, y)
−α(|x|2 + |y|2 + |p|2 − |q|2)− 〈ζ, (x, y, p, q)〉 .
Note that, because of the penalisation term α(|x|2 + |y|2), for any η > 0, we can choose
γ small enough such that, for any ζ such that |ζ| ≤ γ, any maximum of zζ is of the form
(x, y, p, q) for some (x, y) ∈ Bη.
Let γ as above. Since z0 is semiconvex, has a maximum at (0, 0, p, q), Jensen maximum
principle (see Lemma A.3 of [9] for instance) states that the set
Eγ =


(x, y, p, q) ∈ Bη ×∆(I)×∆(J) , ∃ζ , |ζ| ≤ γ , such that
(i) zζ has a maximum at (x, y, p, q) and
(ii) wˆ1 and wˆ2 have a derivative at (x, y, p, q)


has a positive measure. We note that in the quoted Lemma A.3, the maximum is required
to be strict ; this assumption is only used in [9] to localize the maximum points, which is
not needed here.
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We also note for later use that, if (x, y, p, q) ∈ Eγ , there is some ζ = (ζx, ζy, ζp, ζq) with
|ζ| ≤ γ such that zζ has a maximum at (x, y, p, q). In particular, this implies that
q′ → wˆ1(x, p, q
′)− wˆ2(y, p, q
′) + α|q′|2 − 〈ζq, q
′〉
has a maximum at q. Since wˆ2 is concave in q, wˆ1 coincides with its concave hull with
respect to q at (x, p, q). Hence, if we set qˆ = ∂wˆ1(x,p,q)
∂q
, then
wˆ1(x, p, q) + wˆ
♯
1(x, p, qˆ) = q.qˆ and q ∈ ∂
+
qˆ wˆ
♯
1(x, p, qˆ) . (6.38)
In the same way, if we set pˆ = ∂wˆ2(y,p,q)
∂p
, then we have
wˆ2(x, p, q) + wˆ
∗
2(y, pˆ, q) = p.pˆ and p ∈ ∂
−
pˆ wˆ
∗
2(x, pˆ, q) . (6.39)
Step 3 : measure estimate of a subset of Eγ. Let E
′
γ be the set of points (x, y, p, q) ∈ Eγ
such that wˆ♯1 has a second order Taylor expansion at (x, p,
∂wˆ1
∂q
(x, p, q)) and wˆ∗2 has a second
order Taylor expansion at (y, ∂wˆ2
∂p
(x, p, q), q). Our aim is to show that E′γ has a full measure
in Eγ .
For this we note that E′γ = E
1
γ ∩ E
2
γ where
E1γ =
{
(x, y, p, q) ∈ Eγ , wˆ
♯
1 has a second order Taylor expansion
at (x, p, ∂wˆ1
∂q
(x, p, q))
}
and
E2γ =
{
(x, y, p, q) ∈ Eγ , wˆ
∗
2 has a second order Taylor expansion
at (y, ∂wˆ2
∂p
(x, p, q), q)
}
It is therefore enough to show that E1γ and E
2
γ have a full measure in Eγ . We only do the
proof for E1γ , the proof for E
2
γ being symmetric.
Let us set, for any (x, y, p),
Eγ(x, y, p) = {q ∈ ∆(J) , (x, y, p, q) ∈ Eγ}
and
E1γ(x, y, p) = {q ∈ ∆(J) , (x, y, p, q) ∈ E
1
γ}
Since Eγ has a positive measure, from Fubini Theorem we have to show that, for any (x, y, p)
such that the set Eγ(x, y, p) has a positive measure, the set E
1
γ(x, y, p) has a full measure
in Eγ(x, y, p).
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For this, let us introduce the map Φ : q → ∂wˆ1(x,p,q)
∂q
defined on Eγ(x, y, p). We are going
to show that
∀q1, q2 ∈ Eγ(x, y, p), |q1 − q2| ≤
1
2α
|Φ(q1)− Φ(q2)| , (6.40)
which will imply that
∀E ⊂ Eγ(x, y, p) measurable, L
J(E) ≤
1
(2α)I
LJ(Φ(E)) , (6.41)
where LJ denotes the Lebesgue measure in IRJ . Then we will prove that (6.41) implies our
claim.
Proof of (6.40) : Let q1, q2 ∈ Eγ(x, y, p). There are ζ1 and ζ2 such that zζk has a
maximum at (x, y, p, qk) for k = 1, 2. The first order optimality conditions imply that
Φ(qk) =
∂wˆ2(y, p, qk)
∂q
− 2αqk + ζk,q for k = 1, 2.
Using again the optimality of zζ1 at q1 and the fact that q → wˆ2(y, p, q) is concave, we have
wˆ1(x, p, q2) ≤ wˆ1(x, p, q1) + 〈
(
∂wˆ2(y,p,qk)
∂q
− 2αq1 + ζ1,q
)
, (q2 − q1)〉 − α|q2 − q1|
2
≤ wˆ1(x, p, q1) + 〈Φ(q1), (q2 − q1)〉 − α|q2 − q1|
2
Reversing the role of q1 and q2 gives
wˆ1(x, p, q1) ≤ wˆ1(x, p, q2) + 〈Φ(q2), (q1 − q2)〉 − α|q2 − q1|
2
Adding the two previous inequalities then leads to
0 ≤ (Φ(q2)− Φ(q1)).(q1 − q2)− 2α|q2 − q1|
2 .
Whence (6.40).
Proof of (6.41) : Let E be a measurable subset of Eγ(x, y, p). We note that (6.40)
states that Φ is a bijection between E and its image, with a 12α−Lipschitz continuous inverse.
Hence
LI(E) = LI(Φ−1(Φ(E))) ≤
1
(2α)I
LI(Φ(E)) ,
i.e., (6.41) holds.
We finally show that E1γ(x, y, p) has a full measure in Eγ(x, y, p) for any (x, y, p) such
that Eγ(x, y, p) has a positive measure. Let F be the set of (x, p, qˆ) such that wˆ
♯
1 has
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a second order Taylor expansion at (x, p, qˆ). Since F has a full measure, for almost all
(x, p) ∈ IRn × ∆(I), the set F (x, p) = {qˆ ∈ IRJ , (x, p, qˆ) ∈ F} has a full measure in
IRJ . Let (x, p) be such a pair and such that Eγ(x, y, p) has a positive measure. Then
Φ(Eγ(x, y, p)) also has a positive measure from (6.41). Since Φ(Eγ(x, y, p))\F (x, p) has a
zero measure and since
Φ−1 (Φ(Eγ(x, y, p))\F (x, p)) = Eγ(x, y, p)\E
1
γ(x, y, p) ,
using again (6.41) shows that Eγ(x, y, p)\E
1
γ(x, y, p) has a zero measure. This completes
our claim.
Step 4 : (further) magic properties of sup-convolution. We now explain that one
can use second order Taylor expansions of wˆ♯1 and wˆ
∗
2 to get elements of D
2,−w♯1, D
2,+wˆ1,
D2,+w∗2 and D
2,−wˆ1.
¿From our assumption (6.36), we know that, for ǫ small enough, if (0, 0, p, q) realizes
the equality in (6.37), then (p, q) belongs to the interior of ∆(I)×∆(J). Hence we can find
α, γ > 0 so small that, for any ζ with |ζ| ≤ γ, if (x, y, p, q) realizes the maximum of zζ , then
(p, q) belongs to the interior of ∆(I)×∆(J).
Let us now fix γ > 0 small enough and let us compute wˆ♯1 at (x, p, qˆ) for (x, y, p, q) ∈ E
′
γ
and qˆ = ∂wˆ1(x,p,q)
∂q
. We have
wˆ♯1(x, p, qˆ) = min
x′,q′,q”
(q′.qˆ +
λ
2
|x′ − x|2 +
λ′
2
|q”− q′|2)− w1(x
′, p, q”)) (6.42)
¿From (6.38), we have that wˆ1(x, p, q)+wˆ
♯
1(x, p, qˆ) = q.qˆ and q ∈ ∂
+
qˆ wˆ
♯
1(x, p, qˆ). In particular,
q′ = q is a minimum point in (6.42). Since q belongs to the interior of ∆(J), the optimality
conditions imply that, if (x′, q, q”) is a minimum of (6.42), then q = q”− 1
λ′
qˆ. Therefore
wˆ♯1(x, p, qˆ) = −
1
2λ′ |qˆ|
2 +minx′,q”(q”.qˆ − w1(x
′, p, q”) + λ2 |x
′ − x|2)
= − 12λ′ |qˆ|
2 +minx′(w
♯
1(x
′, p, qˆ) + λ2 |x
′ − x|2) ,
In particular, q” ∈ ∂+qˆ w1(x
′, p, qˆ), which shows that
q +
1
λ′
qˆ ∈ ∂+qˆ w
♯
1(x+ ξ/λ, p, qˆ) (6.43)
Moreover, x → wˆ♯1(x, p, qˆ) is equal, up to a constant, to the inf-convolution of w
♯
1 with
respect to x. Since wˆ♯1 has a second order Taylor expansion in x at such a point (x, p, qˆ), the
classical “magic properties” of inf-convolution (see Lemma A.4 of [9]) state that x′ = x+ξ/λ
and
(Dwˆ♯1(x, p, qˆ),D
2wˆ♯1(x, p, qˆ)) ∈ D
2,−w♯1(x+ ξ/λ, p, qˆ) . (6.44)
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where ξ = Dwˆ♯1(x, p, qˆ).
Following [1] we also note that for any x′ close to x, we have
wˆ1(x
′, p, q) ≤ q.qˆ − wˆ♯1(x
′, p, qˆ) = wˆ1(x, p, qˆ) + wˆ
♯
1(x, p, qˆ)− wˆ
♯
1(x
′, p, qˆ)
because wˆ1(x, p, q) + wˆ
♯
1(x, p, qˆ) = q.qˆ. Since wˆ
♯
1 has a second order Taylor expansion at x,
this gives
− (Dwˆ♯1(x, p, qˆ),D
2wˆ♯1(x, p, qˆ)) ∈ D
2,+wˆ1(x, p, q) . (6.45)
In a symmetric way, if (x, y, p, q) ∈ E′γ and pˆ =
∂wˆ2(y,p,q)
∂p
, then
(Dwˆ∗2(y, pˆ, q),D
2wˆ∗2(y, pˆ, q)) ∈ D
2,+w∗2(y + ξ/λ, pˆ, q) , (6.46)
where ξ = Dwˆ∗2(y, pˆ, q),
p+
1
λ′
pˆ ∈ ∂−pˆ w
∗
2(y + ξ/λ, pˆ, q) (6.47)
and
− (Dwˆ∗2(y, pˆ, q),D
2wˆ∗2(y, pˆ, q)) ∈ D
2,−wˆ2(y, p, q) . (6.48)
Step 5 : conclusion. From the previous steps, we know that the set E′γ defined in step
3 has a positive measure for any α, γ > 0 sufficiently small. Hence we can find sequences
λ′n → +∞, αn, γn → 0
+, ζn = (ζ
n
x , ζ
n
y , ζ
n
p , ζ
n
q ) → 0, (xn, yn, pn, qn) converging to some
(0, 0, p¯, q¯) such that (xn, yn, pn, qn) ∈ E
′
γ and such that the map zζn has a maximum at
(xn, yn, pn, qn).
Let us set
pˆn =
∂wˆ2(y,pn, qn)
∂p
, qˆn =
∂wˆ1(x,pn, qn)
∂q
, (6.49)
(ξn1 ,X
n
1 ) = (Dwˆ
♯
1(xn, pn, qˆn),D
2wˆ♯1(xn, pn, qˆn))
and
(ξn2 ,X
n
2 ) = (Dwˆ
∗
2(yn, pˆn, qn),D
2wˆ∗2(yn, pˆn, qn)) .
¿From (6.43) and (6.47) we have
pn +
1
λ′n
pˆn ∈ ∂
−
pˆ w
∗
2(yn + ξ
n
2 /λ, pˆn, qn) and qn +
1
λ′n
qˆn ∈ ∂
+
qˆ w
♯
1(xn + ξ
1
n/λ, pn, qˆn) . (6.50)
¿From (6.45) and (6.48) we have
−(ξn1 ,X
n
1 ) ∈ D
2,+wˆ1(xn, pn, qn) and − (ξ
n
2 ,X
n
2 ) ∈ D
2,−wˆ2(xn, pn, qn) ,
Since furthermore (x, y)→ zζn(x, y, pn, qn) has a maximum at (xn, yn, pn, qn), the first and
second order optimality conditions imply that
(−ξn1 , ξ
n
2 ) = (A+ ǫA
2)(xn, yn) + 2αn(xn, yn) + (ζ
n
x , ζ
n
y ) (6.51)
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and (
1
ǫ
+ ‖A‖
)
I ≤
(
−Xn1 0
0 Xn2
)
≤ A+ ǫA2 + 2αnI (6.52)
The left-hand side inequality is due to the fact that wˆ1 and wˆ2 are semiconvex and semi-
concave w.r. to x and y respectively with a modulus λ = 1
ǫ
+ ‖A‖. Using (6.44) and (6.46)
gives
(ξn1 ,X
n
1 ) ∈ D
2,−w♯2(xn + ξ
n
1 /λ, pn, qˆn) and (ξ
n
2 ,X
n
2 ) ∈ D
2,+w∗1(yn + ξ
n
2 /λ, pˆn, qn) (6.53)
We now note that (Xn1 ), (X
n
2 ), (pˆn) and (qˆn) are bounded. For (X
n
1 ), (X
n
2 ) this is an
obvious consequence of (6.52). For (pˆn) and (qˆn) this comes from (6.49), from the Lipschitz
continuity assumption of w2 and w1 with respect to p and q respectively and from the
definition of wˆ1 and wˆ2.
We now let n→ +∞. From (6.51), we have ξn1 , ξ
n
2 → 0. We can assume that (pˆn, qˆn)→
(pˆ, qˆ), Xn1 → X1 and X
n
2 → X2. Then we have from (6.50), (6.53) and (6.52) that:
p¯ ∈ ∂−pˆ w
∗
2(0, pˆ, q¯) and q¯ ∈ ∂
+
qˆ w
♯
1(0, p¯, qˆ) ,
(0,X1) ∈ D2,−w
♯
2(0, p¯, qˆ) and (0,X2) ∈ D
2,+w∗1(0, pˆ, q¯)
and (
1
ǫ
+ ‖A‖
)
I ≤
(
−X1 0
0 X2
)
≤ A+ ǫA2 .
2
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